

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1857
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 JERUSALEM 2703

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FROM ATHERTON

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (ATHERTON, ALFRED L., JR.)
SUBJECT: CAMP DAVID FOLLOW-UP: BRIEFING OF ISRAELIS

1. SEPTEMBER 29 SAM LEWIS AND I MET WITH BEGIN. DAYAN, BURG, PATTIR, AVNER, PORAT AND RUBENSTEIN WERE PRESENT ON THE ISRAELI SIDE. AFTER RAISING ARRANGEMENTS FOR WASHINGTON NEGOTIATIONS (BEING REPORTED TEL AVIV SEPTEL), BEGIN ASKED THAT I BRIEF HIM THEN ON SECRETARY'S AND MY OWN MEETINGS IN FOLLOW-UP TO CAMP DAVID.

2. I SAID PRESIDENT HAD WANTED ME TO GIVE ISRAELIS A FRANK ACCOUNT, KEEPING IN MIND THAT ARAB AND OTHER LEADERS HAD BEEN TALKING TO US IN CONFIDENCE AND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WHAT I TOLD ISRAELIS NOT GET INTO MEDIA. I SAID MAIN THRUST OF SECRETARY'S AND MY OWN VISITS TO ARAB CAPITALS HAD BEEN TO TRY TO GET ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO KEEP AN OPEN MIND AND TO UNDERSTAND CAMP DAVID ACHIEVEMENTS AS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD PEACE AND TO ENCOURAGE THEIR SUPPORT.

3. I NOTED THERE WERE GENERAL CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY ALL THE ARAB
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LEADERS. THEY FELT AGREEMENTS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH WITH RESPECT TO WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK. WITH RESPECT TO PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, THEY INTERPRET AGREEMENTS AS DEALING PRIMARILY WITH INHABITANTS OF WEST BANK AND GAZA AND AS IGNORING MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS WHO LIVE OUTSIDE OF THIS AREA. THEY INTERPRET AGREEMENTS AS BASICALLY AN AGENDA FOR SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT ASSURANCE THAT A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE WILL BE ACHIEVED.

FINALLY, THEY NOTE THAT DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES DO NOT MENTION JERUSALEM. I EXPLAINED THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THE PROVISION FOR EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON JERUSALEM AND THAT WE HAD EXPLAINED IN EACH CAPITAL WHY IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO HANDLE JERUSALEM QUESTION IN THIS MANNER.

4. TURNING TO SPECIFIC REACTIONS, I NOTED THAT WHAT CAME THROUGH MOST CLEARLY IN SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH HUSSEIN AND AGAIN WHEN I SAW HIM SEPTEMBER 27, WAS A REACTION OF TOTAL SURPRISE THAT CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS HAD RESULTED IN MUCH MORE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS THAN HE HAD ANTICIPATED. HE IS TRYING TO SORT OUT WHAT IT ALL MEANS. HE DISPLAYS A SENSE OF BEING HURT THAT HE WAS NOT CONSULTED ON JORDAN'S SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ANTICIPATED ULTIMATE ARRANGEMENTS. I SAID THIS SENSE OF HURT SEEMS TO INDICATE CONSIDERABLE SUSPICION OF SADAT, AND THAT EGYPTIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS HAD NOT BEEN VERY GOOD OVER THE YEARS. I NOTED SECRETARY, IN ANSWERING MANY SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FROM HUSSEIN, HAD TRIED TO GET HIM TO FOCUS ON THE OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A MANNER BENEFICIAL TO JORDAN'S INTEREST AND STABILITY AND MODERATION IN THE AREA. THE SECRETARY HAD NOTED RISK OF LOSING THIS OPPORTUNITY BY HESITATING TOO LONG. I POINTED OUT THAT HUSSEIN, HAVING ASKED MANY QUESTIONS IN MEETING WITH SECRETARY, HAD PROPOSED PRESENTING US WITH ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS, WHICH HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED TO WASHINGTON SEPTEMBER 29. I ADDED THAT WE WILL BE REFLECTING ON WHAT WE CAN SAY IN REPLYING TO THESE QUESTIONS. I DESCRIBED HUSSEIN AS CLEARLY
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NOT READY TO MAKE UP HIS MIND, NEEDING TIME TO REFLECT AND TO CONSULT WITH HIS OWN PEOPLE AND WITH NEIGHBORS. HE HAD TOLD ME HE HAD RESISTED ASSAD'S AND QADDAFI'S URGINGS THAT HE JOIN REJECTIONIST GROUP, REPLYING THAT HE WOULD MAKE HIS OWN DECISIONS ON BASIS OF JORDAN'S NATIONAL INTEREST BUT WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THEM HE IS OFF SEPTEMBER 30 TO CONSULT IN SAUDI ARABIA AND GULF STATES. HE FEELS CONFLICTING PRESSURES IN ARAB WORLD AND WITHIN JORDAN ITSELF, WHERE A SERIOUS DEBATE IS UNDERWAY WITHIN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND SOME INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE PRIVATELY HAVE EXPRESSED REAL INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITIES CAMP DAVID PRESENTS. I MENTIONED THAT IN MY MEETING WITH HIM HUSSEIN HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN WHETHER A MEANINGFUL AND FULL ROLE IS CONTEMPLATED FOR JORDAN NOT ONLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT ALSO IN THE FINAL WEST BANK SETTLEMENT. HUSSEIN REALIZES CAMP DAVID PRESENTS A MAJOR NEW SITUATION AND IS CONCERNED NOT TO MAKE AN HISTORIC MISTAKE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO ENTER.

5. DAYAN RAISED HUSSEIN'S CONCERN THAT MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS OUTSIDE WEST BANK/GAZA ARE INADEQUATELY COVERED IN AGREEMENTS. HE NOTED AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR REFUGEES AND ASKED WHETHER HUSSEIN THOUGHT ISRAEL SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITH PALESTINIANS OUTSIDE WEST BANK/GAZA. I RESPONDED THAT HUSSEIN, LIKE OTHER ARABS WE

HAD MET, HAD MENTIONED INADEQUATE STRESS ON PALESTINIANS LIVING OUTSIDE WEST BANK/GAZA BUT THAT POINT HAD NOT BEEN PROMINENT IN HIS PRESENTATION, AS IT HAD FOR EXAMPLE WITH THE SAUDIS. DAYAN ASKED IF WE HAD A MORE SPECIFIC IDEA OF WHAT ROLE HUSSEIN WOULD LIKE. I REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFIC ON THIS POINT, BUT HAD COMMENTED THAT THE AGREEMENTS LOOK AS IF JORDAN IS BEING ASKED TO FILL A FEW GAPS. BEGIN ASKED IF WE WOULD DESCRIBE HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE AS "NON-COMMITTAL." I SAID YES, HUSSEIN HAS A NUMBER OF DOUBTS IN HIS MIND AND COULD NOT SAY ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WHAT HE WILL DO. HE NEEDS TIME TO CONSULT AND REFLECT.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1858
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 JERUSALEM 2703

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FROM ATHERTON

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECRETARY

DR. BURG ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE DECISIVE FACTOR FOR HUSSEIN. I REPLIED THAT I COULD NOT ANSWER THAT WITH CERTAINTY. PERHAPS ONE FACTOR WILL BE WHETHER THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS APPEARS TO BE MOVING FORWARD WITH REAL PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. PERHAPS ANOTHER WOULD BE WHETHER HE IS ASSURED THAT THE AGREEMENTS DO NOT EXCLUDE ACHIEVEMENT OF JORDAN'S BASIC OBJECTIVES IN A FINAL TREATY. HE WOULD PREFER MORE CONCRETE INDICATIONS IN THE AGREEMENTS THEMSELVES OF THE FINAL OUTCOME, ALTHOUGH HE APPEARS TO UNDERSTAND THAT SOME DIFFICULT POINTS WILL HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED.

6. BEGIN NOTED INDICATIONS THAT PRO-HUSSEIN ELEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK ARE ORGANIZING PROTEST MEETINGS AGAINST CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. HE SAID IT IS ISRAEL'S EXPERIENCE THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE THE RESULT OF ENCOURAGEMENT FROM JORDAN, IF NOT NECESSARILY FROM THE KING HIMSELF, AND HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY INFORMATION WE MAY HAVE ON WHETHER JORDAN IS ENCOURAGING A NEGATIVE REACTION

AMONG THE WEST BANKERS. AT THIS POINT, DAYAN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN HEARING THE OUTCOME OF MY PLANNED MEETING WITH WEST BANKERS AND GAZANS EVENING SEPTEMBER 29.

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7. TURNING TO SAUDI VISIT, I NOTED SECRETARY HAD SPECIAL POINT WITH FAHD OF THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON CAMP DAVID WHICH COULD AVOID STALEMATE AND PROVIDE A BULWARK AGAINST SOVIET AND RADICAL INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. I DESCRIBED FAHD AS VERY POSITIVE IN APPRECIATION OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE AND IN GENERAL EXPRESSING A DESIRE TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT. I NOTED FAHD WANTS TO SUPPORT SADAT. AT SAME TIME, HE IS CONCERNED WITH TENSIONS AND DIVISIONS IN ARAB WORLD AND WANTS TO FIND A WAY TO HEAL THEM. SAUDIS THUS HAVE CONTRADICTORY OBJECTIVES AND DID NOT SUGGEST HOW THEY COULD RECONCILE THEM. FAHD HAD PLACED PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON SAUDI IMPRESSION THAT CAMP DAVID DOCUMENTS GIVE TOO LITTLE ATTENTION TO PROTECTING RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS, PARTICULARLY THOSE LIVING OUTSIDE WEST BANK/GAZA. THEY WOULD LIKE A PROVISION FOR FULL SELF-DETERMINATION FOR PALESTINIANS.

8. PROFESSOR BURG ASKED WHAT MOTIVATES APPARENT SAUDI CONCERN FOR PALESTINIANS. IS IT A PRETEXT, OR MORE? I REPLIED THAT IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A PRETEXT, IT IS PART OF THE LONGSTANDING SAUDI POSITION, AND THAT IT SEEMS TO REFLECT CONCERN THAT PALESTINIANS, IF THEIR DEMANDS ARE NOT SATISFIED, WILL BE SOURCE OF UNREST AND INSTABILITY IN THE REGION. I SUMMARIZED PRESENT SAUDI POSTURE AS ONE OF RESERVING THEIR POSITION WHILE CONSULTING AND REFLECTING. THEY INDICATE THEY WOULD LIKE TO TAKE A MORE POSITIVE AND HELPFUL ROLE BUT FIND THIS DIFFICULT UNLESS THERE IS MORE ASSURANCE FOR THE PALESTINIANS THAN THE DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES APPEAR TO CONTAIN. BURG ASKED IF THE SAUDIS HAD RAISED JERUSALEM. I SAID THEY HAD, THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE STANDARD SAUDI POSITION, AND THAT THE SECRETARY HAD EXPLAINED TO THEM WHY WE HAD HANDLED JERUSALEM AS WE DID AT CAMP DAVID. DAYAN SAID THAT UNLIKE JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA COULD AVOID AN ACTIVE ROLE AND ONE COULD LIVE WITH THIS. I AGREED THAT THAT IS BASICALLY TRUE IF THE SAUDIS DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE JORDANIAN DECISION OR MAKE LIFE MORE DIFFICULT FOR

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SADAT. SAUDI ARABIA COULD AVOID A PUBLIC POSITION WHILE CONTINUING TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO EGYPT AND JORDAN. I NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE SAUDIS KEEP A RESERVED POSITION, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FOR THE GULF STATES, TO COME FORWARD.

9. AT THIS POINT BEGIN ASKED ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE ARAFAT-HUSSEIN MEETING, AND WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN A RECONCILIATION. I REPLIED THAT HUSSEIN'S MEETING WAS REALLY WITH QADDAFI, THAT HUSSEIN TOLD US HE WAS NOT AWARE ARAFAT WOULD COME ALONG UNTIL AFTER HE HAD AGREED TO MEET QADDAFI. I DID NOT THINK THERE HAD BEEN OFFERS OF OLIVE BRANCHES ALTHOUGH I DID NOT RULE OUT CONTINUING EXCHANGES BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT. HUSSEIN TOLD US ALSO THAT HE HAD MADE NO COMMITMENTS TO QADDAFI AND IT SEEMED TO US THAT HE IS NOT MOVING TOWARD THE "STEADFASTNESS" GROUP. AMBASSADOR LEWIS SAID WE HAD INDICATIONS HUSSEIN IS TAKING A STRONG POSITION AGAINST READMITTING THE FEDAYEEN TO JORDAN AND HAS MADE CLEAR TO HIS MILITARY THAT HIS MEETING WITH ARAFAT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS BASIC POLICY.

10. TURNING TO SECRETARY'S VISIT TO DAMASCUS, I NOTED CORDIALITY OF ASSAD'S RECEPTION DESPITE PRIOR ISSUANCE OF STEADFASTNESS COMMUNIQUE INDICATING THAT U.S. IS TO BE TREATED AS AN "ENEMY." I NOTED LENGTH OF MEETING, ASSAD'S CAREFUL PREPARATION AND HIS MANY PRECISE QUESTIONS. I DESCRIBED HIS POSITION IN DISCUSSIONS AS VERY MUCH THAT REFLECTED IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HE IS CONVINCED THAT SADAT HAS ABANDONED ARAB CAUSE AND THAT CAMP DAVID IS A FRAMEWORK FOR A SEPARATE PEACE. HE IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT INADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO GOLAN. HE GAVE NO INDICATIONS HE IS CONSIDERING MODERATING HIS OPPOSITION, DESPITE SECRETARY'S STRESS ON CAMP DAVID'S PRESENTING AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED. I NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT ASSAD WAS VERY FIRM IN EXPRESSING HIS COMMITMENT TO PEACE ON BASIS RESOLUTION 338 AND THROUGH THE GENEVA FORUM WITH ALL PARTIES REPRESENTED, AND IN EXPRESSING HIS DESIRE TO STAY IN DIALOGUE WITH US.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 JERUSALEM 2703

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FROM ATHERTON

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECRETARY

11. DAYAN ASKED IF WE HAD TALKED TO ASSAD ABOUT LEBANON. I SAID THE SECRETARY HAD RETIERATED IN SOME DETAIL THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS A UNITED, STABLE LEBANON WITH A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. ASSAD HAD SAID THAT THIS IS ALSO HIS OBJECTIVE. WHILE WE AGREED THAT OUR OBJECTIVES ARE SIMILAR, THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION ON HOW TO PROCEED AND NO POLICY CONCLUSIONS. ASSAD HAD INDICATED SUSPICION ABOUT WHAT WE ARE SEEKING IN LEBANON. HE WAS ESPECIALLY CRITICAL OF THE ISRAELI ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIA AND HAD INDICATED SOME SUSPICIONS THAT THE U.S. IS COOPERATING IN THIS RESPECT WITH ISRAEL AND THE MILITIAS. BEGIN ASKED IF ASSAD HAD MADE ANY COMMITMENT TO A CEASEFIRE, NOTING THAT DURING THE CAMP DAVID MEETING ASSAD HAD NOT REPLIED TO THE PRESIDENT ON THIS POINT. I SAID THAT MY RECOLLECTION WAS THAT ASSAD'S REPLY, LIKE SYRIAN RESPONSES IN THE PAST, INDICATED THAT SYRIA IS NOT STARTING THE SHOOTING BUT MERELY REACTING TO THE PROVOCATION OF OTHERS. I SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY CRITICAL OF THE MARONITES, ASSERTING THAT LEBANON NEEDS A POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN WHICH THEY ARE NOT DOMINANT, AND NOTING THAT THE MILITIAS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHRISTIAN OPINION. AMBASSADOR LEWIS READ THE ISRAELIS THE SECTION OF PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 28 PRESS CONFERENCE MENTION-
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ING THE IDEA OF A CONFERENCE ON THE LEBANESE PROBLEM.

12. CONTINUING, I SAID THAT IN KUWAIT, I HAD FOUND THE KUWAITIS NOT PREPARED TO SUPPORT CAMP DAVID, ESPECIALLY CRITICAL OF THE LACK OF SPECIFICITY IN DEALING WITH PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, BUT STATING THAT WHAT SADAT DOES ABOUT SINAI IS HIS OWN AFFAIR.

13. I DESCRIBED THE SHAH AS HAVING CAREFULLY STUDIED THE AGREEMENTS AND AS FOCUSING ESPECIALLY ON THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY IRAN'S SECURITY. THE SHAH HAD NOTED THAT THE REACTION OF THE ARABS THREATENED TO DEEPEN DIVISIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD, GIVING NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO SOVIETS. SHAH HAD INDICATED CONCERN FOR STABILITY OF JORDAN BUT DID NOT SAY WHETHER HE WOULD ADVISE HUSSEIN ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. HE HAD MADE CLEAR HIS SUPPORT FOR SADAT AND HIS FEELING THAT SADAT SHOULD GO THROUGH WITH EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY NEGOTIATIONS. HE

SAID HE APPEARED WORRIED ABOUT ARAB REACTION TO CAMP DAVID AND NOT READY TO COME TO ANY CONCLUSIONS AT THIS TIME. BEGIN ASKED ABOUT SHAH'S OWN SITUATION. I DESCRIBED THIS AS A DIFFICULT PERIOD OF FERMENT IN IRAN AND NOTED THE SHAH UNDERSTANDS THERE IS NO QUICK SOLUTION.

14. I NOTED THAT YIGIT AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN ANKARA HAD HAD A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH REFLECTED CONCERN FOR ARAB REACTION TO CAMP DAVID. THEY HAD SUGGESTED TURKEY WILL TAKE A RESERVED POSITION AND AVOID BECOMING INVOLVED IN INTRA-ARAB QUARRELS. I HAD PRESSED THE STRATEGIC INTEREST IN THE BROADER REGION IN PUSHING ON WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF CAMP DAVID. OUR EMBASSY IN ANKARA THOUGHT THAT ON REFLECTION THE TURKS MIGHT BECOME LESS CRITICAL.

15. IN EXPRESSING HIS GRATITUDE FOR THE BRIEFING, BEGIN ASKED THAT WHEN I SEE PRESIDENT SADAT SEPTEMBER 30, I GIVE HIM WARM
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REGARDS, EXPLAIN THAT POST-CAMP DAVID THEY ARE FRIENDS AND THAT BEGIN WISHES TO CONDUCT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP. HE ALSO ASKED THAT I EMPHASIZE THE DIFFICULT POLITICAL PROBLEMS BEGIN HAS FACED IN OBTAINING KNESSET APPROVAL OF THE AGREEMENTS.

16. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO CAIRO, JIDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, TEHRAN AND ANKARA.
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